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1. Introduction 
Databases are designed to be shared by a number of users, and so a method is 
needed to ensure that only authorized users can access data stored in the database. The 
aim of this paper is to propose a scheme which allows a hierarchical organization of 
encryption and decryption keys associated with the levels of security in the database 
system. The scheme uses the same method as the RSA cryptosystem [RISH78] to 
encrypt and decrypt data and provides security based on the difficulty of solving the 
Discrete Logarithm problem [DIHE76] which is known to be NPI [GAJ079]. Each user 
is issued a key which is used for decryption and used for user clearance verification. 
Users having higher clearance levels can read data of lower clearance level, while users 
with lower clearance levels can request data to be stored as being of higher level than the 
user's clearance. In our discussion we consider three levels of security for data, the 
highest level is the A-level, second is the B-Ievel, and the lowest level is the C-Ievel. 
Correspondingly, there are three groups of users: the A-clearance, B-clearance and C-
clearance groups. The ideas in this paper can be easily extended to more than three 
security and clearance levels. This paper does not address the problem of inference 
control (such as that in statistical databases) and the problem of database operations on 
encrypted data. 
The idea of securing databases using cryptographic methods is not new and a 
considerable amount of work has been done in this area. Gudes, Koch and Stahl 
[GUKO?6] has put forward methods to perfonn cryptographic transfonnations in 
databases which preserves data structures. This includes the substitution, transposition, 
reduction and expansion of data items. Davida [DA WE81] has proposed an encryption 
scheme based on the Chinese Remainder Theorem which allows some algebraic 
operations to be perfonned on the encrypted data [DA YE82]. The Chinese Remainder 
Theorem is useful in that given n large primes dj, ... , dn and a particular value Ci such 
that C i = aj mod dj (j = l .... n) all aj values can be retrieved from C i by simply 
calculating Ci mod dj. In this way a database can be encrypted, where record i of the 
database would correspond to Ci, the field values being encrypted would correpond to aj. 
and the decryption keys for field} would correspond to dj. Denning [DENN83] has used 
the Data Encryption Standard (DES) [DES??] to perfonn encryption and authentication at 
the field level. For each data element a distinct cryptographic key is used. The keys are 
constructed by combining the record and field identifiers together with a secret database 
key via a key generating function. Authentication is perfonned using checksums of the 
data elements and the key used to compute_ the checksums are made out of the identifiers 
and the database key. Another proposition which allows operations on encrypted data is 
that of privacy homomorphism put forward by Rivest, Adleman and Dertouzos 
[RIAD78]. The idea is that instead of decrypting data before operations are perfonned, the 
operations are done on the encrypted data. Specialized encryption functions Of privacy 
homomorphisms are used to encrypt data and hence allows operations to be perfonned. 
This presents some applications in securing databases. 
2. Security requirements and assumptions 
Most secure systems classify users into one of a number of security classes or 
groups which corresponds to the security level attached to the data. Furthennore, in these 
systems it is commonly agreed that a "write-up-read-down" rule is observed. This means 
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that any user can read and write data to the database if the data is of the same security 
classification as the user's security clearance. In addition, a user with lower security 
clearance can only write data to a higher level security area or the same security level as 
the user in the database (ie. write-up). A user with a higher security clearance can only 
read data at the same security or from a lower security level (ie. read-down). This 
prevents low clearance users from reading sensitive data of higher security classification, 
and prevents high clearance users from giving higher clearance data to lower clearance 
users. 
In our discussion we assume that the database system used is an untrusted one, 
one taken directly "off the shelf' without any modification. We further assume there is a 
Security System or Filter (similar to [DENN84] and [GRAU84]) which behaves as an 
interface between the user and the database system, and that there is to some extent a 
secure operating system underlying the database. This is shown in fig. 1. All queries to 
the database system pass through the security system which holds all cryptographic 
information necessary to ensure security of data stored in the untrusted database. The 
security system also ensures that only permitted data is passed to a user. Data items 
which are classified higher in the database than the user's security clearance are filtered 
out. Using the security system users can request the retrieved to be delivered either in 
clear form or in an encrypted form. In the first case the security system must perform all 
decryption of the retrieved data and filter out higher level data. In the later case the system 
must reencrypt the filtered data and the user must decrypt user his or her key. This is 
particularly useful for data which need to be transmitted over a public computer network. 
USER 
q""Y • Security encrypted data Database ~"b.j • System • • Management filtered System 
results 
Figure 1. Security system between the user and the database system. 
Other assumptions include the possibility of a Trojan Horse in the database system 
which could either run on its own or run with the aid of a user. To allow operations on 
encrypted data some form of field and record identifiers are used in the database, and that 
they are included in the database encryption. Finally, given that the database is shared it 
is necessary to store the identification of a user who performed the last update to the 
database. This may be part of a log mechanism which is supported in most database 
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systems. A more comprehensive discussion on the requirements and characteristics of 
database encryption can be found in [DAWES!]. Readers wishing to know more on 
other encryption methods are directed to [SEPI88]. 
3. Encryption and decryption in the RSA cryptosystem 
The security of the proposed scheme is achieved by relying on the difficulty of 
solving the Discrete Logarithm Problem [DlHE76]. The scheme follows the RSA 
cryptosystem [RISH78] in the encryption and decryption of messages which is based on 
both the Discrete Logarithm and Factorization problems. Given a message M, encryption 
key Ke and decryption key Kd, M is decrypted and encrypted as follows: 
encrypt: (1) 
decrypt: (2) 
where C in this case is the resulting cryptogram. Here Ke and Kd are chosen such that: 
Ke. Kd = 1 (mod ¢(N) ) (3) 
where N = p. q for prime p and q, and ¢(N) = Icm (p-l, q.l). ¢(N) isthe Euler Totient 
function. Equation (3) is based on Euler's generalization theorem which requires: 
M~(N) = 1 (mod N), gcd(M, N) = 1 (4) 
Here {em means least common multiple and gcd means greatest common divisor. 
In the RSA cryptosystem N is the product of two very large primes p and q. In 
the proposed scheme N does not necessarily have to be the product of only two primes, 
though it is desirable that N is composed out of primes, each to the exponent of one only. 
The RSA cryptosystem makes public the values of N, Ke and C, while in our scheme we 
keep N, (J(N) and Ke secret. Hence the security of the proposed scheme relies only on 
the Discrete Logarithm problem which is known to be NPI. As will be shown later we 
issue decrypting keys to the user in the fonn of a modification to the actual decrypting key 
Kd· 
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4. The proposed scheme 
The proposed scheme uses encryption of data in the database to prevent access by 
illegal users. Each data element is encrypted and then stored in the database. and only 
users with the appropriate decryption keys can decrypt any required data. The keys 
issued to users are chosen in a multilevel fashion. giving a number of higher clearance 
users more "powerful" keys and low clearance users "weaker" keys. Hence. for 
example. an A-clearance user will have more power than a B-clearance user and thus can 
access more data than the B-clearance user. The A-clearance user can read A-level data, 
while the B-clearance user can request data be stored as A-level. 
Part of the proposed scheme is to find suitable keys Ke and Kd which satisfy 
equation (3). One direct way to do this is to let the product of Ke and KdtO be equal to 
DIN) where: 
DIN) ; Ie. ¢IN)) + 1 (5) 
where c is any constant greater than zero. Note that D(N) will always be equal to I 
modulo ¢(N). From equation (5) we can find any two numbers whose product equals 
DIN). and they can be used as Ke and Kdin equation (3). and hence equation (I) and (2). 
In other words any two factors of DIN) whose product equals DIN) can be used as keys 
in (3). We call keys which are taken directly from the set of divisors of DIN) parent 
keys. 
The scheme gets its multilevel property from the fact that given a pair of parent 
keys generated using D(N) for a suitable N and c, these keys can decrypt data encrypted 
using some of the other parent keys also generated from the same D(N). Let us consider 
thatD(N) has the following divisors (d1, d2, dj, ... dn ) in an increasing order and that 
the product of each of I dz. dn ). Id2.dn-Z). Id3. dn-2) • ...• Idk. dn-k+Z) equals DIN). 
Note that these pairs are parent keys, and to each of the security levels A-level, B-Ievel 
and C-Ievel we assign a pair of these divisors. If we encrypt data using dn-j and dj+1ldk 
then we can decrypt using dk because dk = a. dj+1, for some integer a> 0 and positive 
j < n. And thus we have 
dn-j . dk = dn-j . I a. dj+Z) = a I mod ¢IN)) (6) 
and 
(7) 
where Kactual is the actual decryption key used by the security system. So for our data M, 
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Mdn-j. Kactual '" Mdn-j. dj+I (mo4 ¢(N)) '" M ( mod N) (8) 
For example take (dI, dn ), (d2, d._I) and (d3, dn-2) . Assume that dIld3, dIld2 
and d21d3 and we encrypt all A-level data using dn-2, all B-level data using dn-I and all C-
level data using dn . A-clearance users holding key d3 can not only decrypt A-level data, 
but also B-Ievel and C-level data. B-clearance users can decrypt B-Ievel and C-Ievel data, 
while C-cIearance users can only decrypt C-level data. C-clearance users cannot decrypt 
A-level data because d3 does not divide d]. hence equation (7) will give Kactual < 1. On 
seeing this the security system will deny access to the requested data 
5. Example 
To illustrate the discussion in the previous section, we present an example using 
only small numbers. In an actual implementation it is necessary to use numbers in the 
order of three hundred to four hundred digits long for N and c to ensure security, 
• First, let N = 10062, !1I(N) = 3024 and c = 26. 
Then D(N) = 26.3024 + 1 = 78625 , 
and D(N) has divisors: 
5,17,25,37,85,125,185,425,629,925,2125,3145,4625,15725 
or in paiIwise order: 
(5, 15725), (17, 4625), (25, 3145). (37, 2125). (85,925), (125, 629), 
(185, 425). 
To get the parent keys we reduce moOulo !1I(N) : 
(5,605), (17, 1601), (25, 121), (37, 2125), (85, 925), (125, 629), 
(185, 425). 
and the product of each pair equals 1 modulo j2S(N). 
• Next, we assign the group of A-clearance users the key K<JA = 125, the 
B-clearance users key Kd. = 25 , and the C-clearance users key Kdc = 5. 
Here note that Kdc I K<JA ' Kdc I Kda , and Kd. I K<JA . 
An A-clearance user can decrypt any data encrypted using one of the 
following Ke: 
629 or «const. !1I(N» + 629) for const > 0 
121 or « const. 1<l(N) + 121) for const > 0 
605 or «const. !1I(N»+ 605) for const > 0 
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while a B-clearance user user can decrypt any data encrypted using one of the 
following Ke : 
121 or (( const. !1I(N)) + 121) for const > 0 
605 or ((canst. !1I(N» + 605) for const > 0 
and a C-clearance user can only decrypt any data encrypted using Ke: 
605 or ((const. !1I(N» + 605) for const > 0 
• Consider an A-clearance user with requesting access to a data item M encrypted as 
M3145. To get the actual key used internally by the security system, it calculates 
(l = J<,jA. Ke (mod !1I(N» " 125.3145 " 5 (mod !1I(N» . 
This can be done because the system holds all parent keys securely. It then 
calculates: 
Kactual = J<,jA 1 (l 
= 12515 = 25 
and uses Kactual to perform decryption ofM3145, and thus 
• Note that if a B-clearance user with parent decryption key I<da = 25 tries to read 
A-level data M629: 
(l = J<,jB. Ke (mod !1I(N» ,,25 . 629 " 605 (mod !1I(N» 
and 
Kactual = J<,jB 1 (l 
= 25/605 < I 
and hence the system will not decrypt the A-level data. 
6. User decryption keys 
Previously we found an encryption and decryption key for each security level. 
We can simply issue these decryption keys to all users of a security level, hence all users 
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of a level will have exactly the same key. However, it is desirable for each user to have a 
key which is different (or at least looks different) from the other user keys. In this section 
we present two ways to generate user keys from one parent key. We call keys which are 
generated from the parent keys child or children keys. These are the keys issued to the 
users. 
6.1 User key generation based on mUltiplication by another parent key 
First we choose a subsidiary parent key (dx, d".x+l) such that for a given parent 
key (K" Kd) taken from the previous three parent keys all the products: 
does not equal one modulo ¢(N). Next we issue children keys Kd* derived from parent 
decrypting key Kd in the following way: 
Kd' = (( {;. (l(N)) + Kd). dn_x+I 
= ({;. (l(N) . dn-x+I) + (Kd· dn-x+I) (9) 
where 8 is any positive integer greater than zero. Thus we can see from (9) that the 
following is true for data element M: 
(MK,)dxKd' " (MK,.dx)Kd.dn_x+I " 
(MK,Kd)dx-dn_x+I " (MI)I _ M (rrwdN) (10) 
and hence what we have given the user is a child key derived not from one parent key. but 
from two parent keys. Two or more users can try to find r/J(N) by reducing their keys 
modulo some integer i until a common number f3 = ( Kd . dn-x+l) is found. Hence ¢(N) 
equals i . But note that j3 is not a parent key belonging to any of the three security levels. 
As before the security system must keep the subsidiary parent keys (dx , dn-x+l) secret. 
On receiving a key Kd* from the user the system calculates: 
( Kd' . dx ) " II Kd. dn-x+I ) . dx ) 
- (Kd. 1)" Kd (rrwd (l(N)) 
and use Kd to determine the user security clearance and to decrypt the requested data as in 
the example before. The immediate problem here is that the method relies on the dificulty 
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of factoring f3 and hence insecure. Since both Kd and dn.x+l are not necessarily prime, 
factoring {J is not as difficult as the Factorization problem [RISH78]. 
6.2 Generation of user keys based on exponentiation of parent keys 
The second way we propose to generate user keys is to use cenain powers of the 
parent encryption and decryption keys. It is desirable for a given parent encryption key 
Ke and a parent decryption key Kd to find integers X and Y such that the equation 
K"x .K,? = 1 I mod ¢IN)) 
or 
Kef. K,r = 1 I mod ¢IN)) (11) 
are true. To find such X and Y we must proceed with the following calculations: 
from (3) Ke . Kd = 1 I mod ¢IN) ) 
thus Kd = K,] I mod ¢IN)) 
and hence K,r = IK,] yc = K,X I mod ¢IN)). 
Solving equation (11) we have: 
and thus 
Kef -X = 1 I mod ¢(N)) (12) 
must be true. 
Using Euler's theorem in equation (4) we get: 
Ke¢(¢(N)) = 1 I mod ¢IN)) (where gcdlKe, ¢(N)) = 1 ) 
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which means 
Y - x = ¢(¢(NJJ. (13) 
Note That in equation (11) we can interchange the use of X and Y and still 
produce the same results. An example is shown below. 
Example: 
For N = 10062. 1l(N) = 3024 and 11!(11!(N» = 11!(3024) = 864 . 
We take l<d = 125 and Ke = 629. and take X = 65 and Y = 929. 
Now, 
l<dX . KeY 
,. 12565. 629929 
- 2141 . 1637 
,. 1 
,. 125929. 62965 
2141 . 1637 
- 1 (mod 1l(N» 
As before, an A-clearance user with l<d- = 2141 requests access to a data 
item M encrypted as M3145. On receiving the user's key, the security 
system checks: 
l<d •. KeY (mod 1l(N»" 1 
and fmds that the user is an A-clearance user. Thus l<dA = 125. To get the 
actual key used internally by the security system. it calculates a as before 
and then finds Kactual to perform decryption of the required data. 
Here Kcr and KeY children keys of Kd and Ke respectively. From this we see 
that we can give K;< or KdYas the user child decryption key, and encrypt all data 
elements using just Ke. An advantage of using power X or Y of Kd is that we can 
choose a unique X for each user, creating a form of user identification. On receiving a 
user key K~ the security system checks the user security level by solving equation (11) 
using a pre-stored KeY. If the user request data M to be returned in clear form, the 
system simply decrypts cryptogram C = MKe using the secret parent decrypting key Kd 
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as in equation (I) and (2). If the user requests data M to be returned in an encrypted 
fonnat the system returns cryptogram C' to the user where: 
(rrwdN) 
and the user decrypts C' as: 
(rrwd N ). 
Note that a user knowing Kd* = Kcl or Kd* = K,r cannot decrypt data element M stored 
as MKe because Kcl . Ke .. 1 mod ¢(N) and similarly KdY . Ke .. 1 mod ¢(N). 
Compared with the fIrst method the second method provides the most secure way 
of generating unique user decryption keys. There are a number of points which must be 
taken into consideration when we use this solution. First of all, the number of possible 
values of X for K,r is bounded by V¢(N)(Kd) where vm(a) denotes the order of a 
modulo m. This is because Kd generates only a subset of the reduced set of residues 
modulo ¢(N), and since we do not require ¢(N) to be prime it is clear that Kd cannot be a 
primitive root modulo ¢(N). It is of course necesary that Kd and ¢(N) be coprime. 
Given a key K,r and (J(N) the maximum number of user keys that caD be generated 
equals V¢(N)!Kd). Furthermore, out these keys only a total of V¢(N)!Kd) - 4 can be 
useful. This is because 
X=A+ 1 
X= A-I 
X= A 
X=A+1rI2 
gives Kcl '" Kd (mod ¢(N)), 
gives Kcl '" Ke (mod ¢(N)), 
gives Kcl '" 1 (rrwd ¢(N)), and 
gives Kcl (mod ¢(N) = KeY (mod ¢(N) 
(where!t = V¢(NjKd) and ,1,= (constant. V¢(N)!Kd!) ) 
which does not give the desirable security. In addition, out of the remaining keys, there 
are only (V¢(NlKd) - 4)/2 keys which are safe. This is because half of the remaining 
keys are in fact the inverse of the other remaining half. This is shown in the following: 
KIA + i). KIA + !t- i) '" 1 (mod ¢(N)) (for i = 1" .. , 1rI2 -1 ) (14) 
and thus to ensure security we only choose X = A. + i ,for i = 2, ... , 1CI2 - 1. 
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7. A variation of the proposed scheme 
There is a very interesting variation of the proposed scheme. It is based on the 
fact that given a panieular piN) there are more than one N which produces that piN). 
That is, there is a one-to-many mapping between piN) and N. Recall that equation (4) 
requires that gcd(M, N) = 1 for any data M. It is clear that if N is prime equation (4) will 
hold true regardless of M, and that given a non-prime N it is desirable to choose N such 
that it consists of only a small number of prime factors. Thus using (4) we can assign a 
different N to each of the security classification levels in the database and perfonn all 
calculations in each level over a different modulo N. For example we can assign N 1 to the 
A-level, N2 to the B-level and N3 to the C-level. and hence all encryption and decryption 
of A-level data will be performed over modulo N]. B-Ievel data over modulo NZ, and C-
level data over modulo N3. As before N1, NZ and N3 are kept secret in the security 
system. In our example before we had that N = 10062 and piN) = 3024, but in actual 
fact there more than one N value for a given ¢(NJ. Some of the other N values for this 
piN) are: 10584,10668,10836 and 10962. Note that a differentN used in each security 
level will not affect the number of user keys available in that level. In fact, reencryption 
of all data in a particular security level using a new N can be perfonned without having to 
generate new user keys for all user of that clearance level. 
8. Security of the scheme for databases 
The above encryption and decryption scheme presents a very attractive method to 
secure data stored in untrusted databases. The unit of encryption can either be whole 
records, fields or individual data elements in a record. Denning has suggested that field 
encryption may present advantages over record encryption in terms of the amount of 
computation required to perfonn database operations such as projections and selections 
(DENN83]. Our scheme assumes an encryption of individual data elements together with 
record and field identifiers, however it can be extended to encryption of records and 
fields. We also assume that the identifiers are kept in clear form for database operations 
purposes. 
Unlike the RSA cryptosystem, in which N, cryptogram C and encrypting key Ke 
are made public, the proposed scheme only allows the children keys Kd' ; K,r and 
cryptogram C public. The scheme assumes C to be public because it assumes that the 
database system is an untrusted one with "back-doors" to the stored data. GiVt'11 Ih.lt N, 
¢(N), p(p(N)), Ke, Kd, X and Yare all secret, and given that each user has a different 
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key generated using a different X in Ktf, the malicious user or the attacker is faced with 
a problem more difficult than Discrete Logarithm problem. This is because in the RSA 
system N is public, whereas in this scheme N is secret. Without knowing N the attacker 
cannot even attempt to solve the Discrete Logarithm problem. If two or more malicious 
users worked together, their decryption keys cannot be reduced modulo some integer i to 
a common number j3 because each of the keys are already reduced modulo ¢(N). Not 
knowing ¢(N) and X the attacker cannot find Kd from Kd' ~ K,r . 
9. Remarks 
In the above scheme we have taken the approach of giving as little as possible 
cryptographic information to the user. All the user knows is that he or she has a 
(decrypting) key. 
Another advantage of the proposed scheme is that at any time we can re-encrypt 
the whole database using a different modulo N. Although it may require a large amount 
of computation reencryption will thwart the efforts of a penetrator or trojan horse in 
performing ciphenext searching of the database. The reencryption can be done on a copy 
of the database in the background, and brought foward when all entries are reencrypted. 
Otherwise, the secure system can keep track of the old and new N values and anytime a 
data element is accessed it is decrypted over the old N and encrypted over the new N 
value. This way the database is convened in a slow manner. This is because there are 
different values N with the same ¢(N). 
The proposed scheme presents a method to secure distributed database systems. 
In a distributed database system a number of autonomous database systems at remote sites 
cooperate and are linked up via computer networks. Using the proposed scheme we can 
assign a different N to each site and perfonn all encryption and decryption of data at a site 
based on modulo of theN at that site. 
Most distributed database systems use system-wide naming for objects in the 
system, including user names or identification. In this manner a user is recognized at 
every site. Thus depending on how each site organizes it parent and children keys a 
particular user can be designated as having A-clearance at one site and B-clearance at 
another. In this manner the clearance of a user depends on the site which the user wants 
to access, hence preserving autonomy of that site. Note that we can either have a user 
using one key for all sites or one key for each site. 
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10. Summary 
A scheme for multilevel encryption with a variation has been proposed which 
allows users with higher security clearance to read data of lower security classification, 
and which allows users with lower security clearance to store data with higher security 
classification. The scheme is based on the Discrete Logarithm problem to provide its 
security and uses the same encryption and decryption method as the RSA cryptosystern. 
The system holds parent keys which are used to generate children keys. All 
cryptographic information with the exception of the user keys is held securely internally in 
the security system and the system has the ability to deny access to the database. The 
scheme present some ways to encrypt data in a distributed database system and while still 
retaining its multilevel property. 
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